Historical approaches
There have been many theoretical approaches to hypnosis. The first of these was probably that of Franz Anton Mesmer, who argued that the therapeutic effects of his methods were the result of 'animal magnetism' which in some way flowed from his body into the body of his patient. Mesmer's theory was discredited by the 1784 Royal Commission who performed simple but ingenious experiments to demonstrate that the important factors in the mesmeric effect were the patient's beliefs and expectations, not what was actually done to him.
James Braid was the next significant figure. Braid felt the need to dissociate himself from quackery surrounding mesmerism and hence devised a new set of procedures which came to be labelled 'hypnosis', from the Greek word for sleep. Thus began the association between hypnosis and sleep which is still present today. The sleep theory was taken up by a number of subsequent researchers (including Ivan Pavlov), and is reflected in the use of the 'go to sleep'-type terminology which characterizes some modern induction procedures. However, evidence is firmly against the view that hypnosis is any form of sleep. The two are physiologically quite distinct. There is, in fact, no universally acknowledged reliable physiological index of hypnosis. Behaviourally and subjectively the two are also quite distinct. Although the 'hypnotized' subject is often quite inert and inactive as if he were asleep, he certainly does not have to be like this. There are induction procedures in which the subject is encouraged to be alert and active (e.g. Banyai & Hilgard 1976 , Gibbons 1979 . The 'hypnotized' subject is also conscious, aware and responsive to instructions, despite popular views to the contrary.
Hypnosis as a trance state
The popular view which most people have of hypnosis has its origins in the mid-19th centurythat it is some sort of trance state, rather like sleep or somnambulism, in which the subject is unaware of the reality of the situation, remembers nothing of what takes place and is under the complete control of the hypnotist. This view has no doubt been considerably reinforced and embellished by popular fiction writers, such as George Du Maurier (1894) who, with this book 'Trilby' in which he created the malevolent character of Svengali, probably did more to mould public opinion about hypnosis than any reputable scientific source. Modem hypnosis still has to cope with the Svengali image. This is even reflected in the attitudes of the academic world where hypnosis is still widely regarded with great suspicion, an attitude which has hindered the development of competent professional research and tuition in the subject. A recent survey revealed that in only 4 out of 50 university and polytechnic psychology departments in Britain is there any serious attempt to introduce students to the methods and theories of hypnosis, and some departments are against practical instruction on principle (Fellows 1985) . This attitude flies in the face of research on the possible undesirable effects of hypnosis when used in an experimental context, which are minimal and certainly no worse than those resulting from other comparable everyday situations (Orne 1965 , Coe & Ryken 1979 .
One extra problem in the acceptance of hypnosis by the psychological profession has been its long association with medicine and the rather restrictive attitudes adopted by the medical profession (at least until recently) towards its use. The British Society of Medical and Dental Hypnosis does not offer membership to professional psychologists. This has led to the formation of the British Society of Experimental and Clinical Hypnosis. Attitudes fortunately are changing, albeit slowly. In America, Canada and Australia, for example, psychologists play a prominent part in research, practice and professional societies. It is to be hoped that the medical and psychological professions in the UK will establish similar bridges. Figure 1 shows a schematic picture of the traditional or popular view about hypnosis, which is widely held by professionals and lay people alike. This popular view assumes that the subject/patient begins in a waking state and is transformed by means of an induction procedure into a hypnotic trance state. This trance state then makes possible the manifestation of the various phenomena commonly associated with hypnosis following further specific suggestions. It is further assumed that the trance state varies in depth from light to very deep or 'somnambulistic', and that different hypnotic phenomena are characteristic of different depths. Thus, for example, simple arm levitation and eye catalepsy are possible with only a light trance, but a deep trance is required for hallucinations, amnesia and regression.
Alternative approaches to hypnosis Although this traditional picture has not always been accepted by everyone, it is only in the past 30 years or so that it has come under severe critical attack. Modern theorists now divide into two schools according to whether or not they are basically sympathetic to this model. State theorists who would tend to go along with the view that hypnosis involves a special or unique state or 'essence' include notably Ernest Hilgard, Martin Orne, and Milton Erickson. Non-state theorists, on the other hand, reject this model and prefer to see hypnotic responding in terms of psychosocial and cognitive factors. For example, Sarbin & Coe (1972) interpret hypnosis in terms of involved role-playing and thus stress the analogy between the hypnotized subject and the actor on a stage. Barber et al. (1974) place the emphasis upon the subject's willingness to think along with and to imagine the things suggested. Most recently, Wagstaff (1981) has rejected the idea that hypnosis is 'one thing' to be explained, but rather sees it as a collection of phenomena, bound together in name only by the term 'hypnosis', but which demand a number of different explanations. Wagstaff prefers to interpret hypnotic responding in terms of the normal rules of social compliance plus belief in what is happening.
The chief problem for the state theoriest, which has been emphasized most strongly by Barber (1969) in a large number of carefully controlled experiments, is that most if not all of the phenomena commonly associated with hypnosis can be readily produced without the induction of any special trance state. In fact, in the absence of any independent physiological index of its existence, arguments in favour of the state view of hypnosis tend to become circular. How do we cope with this new situation? One strategy is simply to truncate the original model, cutting off the induction and the trance and leaving the phenomena as a response to suggestion. This leaves us with a suggestibility theory of the sort that was promoted by Bernheim in the late 19th century. The induction procedure is thus relegated in Barber et al. 1974) importance to become just another type of suggestion, but a fairly easy one to respond to, a fact which might help to explain its traditional position as a preparatory procedure. But we still have to explain how suggestions work, which is where the non-state theories come in. The state approach, now shorn of its traditional induction procedure, must look towards the suggestions themselves as trance-induction instruments. Thus, some theories have talked about subjects 'slipping into a trance state' while accepting suggestions to hallucinate or regress. The point being made here is that 'genuine' responses to hypnotic suggestions imply an involvement from the subject in which some sort of dissociation is created between the reality and the suggestion. The most coherent version of this type of state view has been presented by Hilgard (1977) as a model emphasizing multiple levels of control in thought and action. The great advantage of this theory is that it takes hypnosis out of the field of 'abnormal' psychology and establishes it firmly as a 'normal' psychological phenomenon. Thus, the theory links hypnosis with a variety of imaginative and semiautomatic activities from everyday life, such as reading a novel, watching a film or driving a car. The current nonstate theories also do this.
Non-state approach to hypnosis The current non-state position is probably best summarized by Figure 2 , which shows the main antecedent variables that have been shown to influence hypnotic-type responsiveness through the mediating variable of involvement and absorption in suggestion-related imaginings. The dependent variables include not only 'hypnotic' behaviour and experiences but also a large set of 'hypnotic-like' experiences which occur in everyday life, such as acting, reading and listening to music. Thus, in this new model, hypnosis is incorporated into the wider domain of human imagination. This does not imply that hypnotic experiences are not real, but only that they should be considered in the broader context of human imagination.
The conclusion that comes over strongly from the research and theory of the past 30 years is that the picture which most of us have of hypnosis, as a rather unique and special state of consciousness in which many remarkable phenomena may occur, is at best oversimplistic and most likely false. Thus, personal and public education is necessary to correct these ideas which may not only inhibit serious research and tuition, but also, as recently witnessed in the debate over the use of hypnosis by the police in the UK, lead to false hopes and expectations. The evidence is now very strong that hypnotic procedures employed in a forensic context certainly do not guarantee the truth of statements or even improve the quality or reliability of information provided by victims or witnesses of crime (Smith 1983 , Udolf 1983 , even though there is widespread belief that they do. Maybe the time has come for the medical and psychological professions to outlaw the use of outdated hypnotic terminology or at least to advocate caution and vigilance in its usage.
